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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK E. LAKE, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. PINDER, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Defendant and 
Appellant, 
STANDARD GILSONITE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, and ROBERT M. 
WILLIAMSON I 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9382 
In the original complaint plaintiff, Jack E. Lake 
sued Standard Gilsonite, Pinder and Williamson. 
The latter were respectively President and Secre-
tary of Standard Gilsonite but they were sued in an 
individual capacity. Williamson was never served 
and thus never became a party. 
l~ I ~ In' the first complaint Lake alleged that Pinder 
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and Williamson, as trustees for the corpora.tion, 
agreed to deliver 37,500 shares of Standard Gilsonite 
stock to plaintiff, and had violated their trust. He 
claimed to be damaged thereby. On June 11, 1959, 
plaintiff and Standard Gilsonite stipulated that Stand-
ard Gilsonite would deliver to Lake 6,500 shares of 
stock whereupon Lake would dismiss the action as 
to Standard Gilsonite Company. Accordingly, the 
action was dismissed as to Standard Gilsonite on the 
15th day of June, 1959. 
On February 1, 1960, without a motion or any 
notice to defendant Pinder, plaintiff amended his 
complaint, stating that Pinder, on behalf of the cor-
poration, agreed to sell Lake 37,500 shares of stock; 
that Pinder then agreed to hold the same as trustee 
for Lake; that subsequently Lake and Pinder entered 
into a joint venture and that Lake agreed to let Pin-
der use Lake's stock to procure Pinder's contribu-
tion to the joint venture upon Pinder's agreement 
to replace the stock so borrowed; and that pursuant 
to this arrangement Pinder used 31000 shares of the 
stock he allegedly was holding for Lake, but that he 
failed to replace the same. 
In his answer, defendant Pinder denied all ma-
terial allegations of plaintiff's complaint. 
At the trial the evidence was very conflicting. 
Lake testified substantially in accordance with the 
allegations of his complaint. 
The so-called "trust" relationship between Pin-
der and Lake assertedly arose because on February 
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11, 1958, Standard Gilsonite Co. had agreed to trade 
37,500 shares of its stock to plaintiff for 7,500 shares 
of stock owned by plaintiff in the L. H. & L. Mining 
Co. (T-60). Subsequently, plaintiff met Pinder, the 
president of Standard Gilsonite Co. (T-53) and on or 
about March 15, 1958, plaintiff delivered his L.H.&L. 
stock to Pinder in Denver, Colorado (T-66). In ex-
change, Pinder gave plaintiff a handwritten letter 
as follows, which was introduced as Exhibit 2: 
"I hand you forthwith a receipt for 7,500 shares 
(Seven Thousand Five Hundred) L.H.&L .. Mining 
stock as trustee to be delivered to Standard Gilso-
nite upon payment of Thirty Seven Thousand Five 
Hundred shares (37 ,500) of Standard stock. Said 
stock to be escrowed on delivery as mutually agreed. 
s/ R. J. Pinder 
President Standard" 
It was uncontraverted that the L.H.&L. stock V\ra_s 
actually delivered to Standard Gilsonite Co. by Pin-
der and that on January 19, 1959, Standard Gilson-
He Co. issued the 37,500 shares in the name of Jack 
E. Lake in care of Standard Gilsonite Co (T-157). 
Up to this point there is little dispute, exceot 
that Pinder denied that he held any property in 
trust for Lake except for the 7,500 shares of L.H.0:L. 
stock which he took from Lake and deliverecl to 
Standard Gilsonite Co. (T-283, 305). Lake, on the 
other hand, claimed that Exhibit 2 constituted Pinder 
trustee of the 37,500 shares of Standard Gilsonite 
stock as well (T-185). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
From this point on the testimony was conflict-
Ing on almost every detail. 
Lake claimed to have owned the franchise for 
the State of Texas to distribute products manufac-
tured by the Life Massage Co. (T-54). He testified 
that Pinder had expressed interest in the said com-
pany (T-54). The exact details of the alleged 'joint 
venture" into the Life Massage business are diffi-
cult to work out from Lake's testimony. At page 57 
of the Transcript he testified: 
" . . . he said that would be no problem to him to 
come up with that money, but he had to work it out 
when he returned to Denver, and I told him I would 
give fifteen percent interest in the company.'' 
000 
"So I told him he could have fifty percent interest 
in the company for putting up the necessary capital 
and he could take all of his money back out of the 
first earnings of the company ... and then he told 
me no, that was too much. He said, 'I want you to 
run the operation.' He said, 'I'm not going to be 
active.' He said, 'I'll finance it. You will have to take 
care of all of the work of running it,' and he said, 
'Let me have my finances back and I'll finance it'." 
"THE COURT: 'Is this Pinder talking? 
A. "Yes. He said he would be active and I won't be 
active. 
"THE COURT: I heard you. 
A. "I said, 'Perfectly agreeable to me.' 
"MR. TUFT: I can't hear you, Mr. Lake. 
A. "I told him it was perfectly agreement with me if 
that was satisfactory to 'him. That he would receive 
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a third of the income of the company. That would 
be net. I would give him one third after all of the 
operating expenses and he would get all of his fi-
nancing back first. I would receive the expenses and 
living expenses until such time as he received his 
capital back." 
There is no further testimony in the record with 
respect to the details of the alleged "joint venture" 
except Mr. Pinder's denial that a joint venture or 
partnership ever existed (T-284, 294, 306-307). 
Evidence was also introduced which showed 
that on March 20, 1958, Pinder gave a check to Lake 
for $1,000. On the back of the check was the legend, 
"Loan to be secured by Standard Gilsonite stock. 
Payable 6 months." Below this legend were affixed 
the signatures of Jack Lake and Stanley J. Lake. This 
check was introduced as Exhibit 26. 
On April 9, 1958, Pinder gave Lake another 
check for $1,000. On the back of this check was the 
word "Loan." Below appeared the signature of Jack 
Lake. This check was introduced as Exhibit 25. 
There was also evidence that in addition to 
these two checks Pinder had advanced Lake $500 
by telegraphic money order (T-177) and an addition-
al $200 also in cash on another occasion. (T-292-93). 
Lake explained these amounts first of all by ad-
mitting that they constituted loans to him personally 
(T-170). After the noon recess, however, Lake testi-
fied that the $2,500 constituted an advance by Pinder 
for the Life Massage venture (T-188, 189). Lake also 
testified that he could not testify "Yes" or "No" as 
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to whether the checks were marked "Loan" when 
given to him. (T-171) (See also T-211 and 125). 
Pinder stated that the checks and the other $500 
were personal loans which he made to Lake person-
ally until Pinder could get to Texas to complete 
the sale of some of Lake's Standard Gilsonite stock 
which was at that time subject to escrow agreement 
with the company (T-285, 286), and further that the 
legends were on the backs of the checks at the time 
they were given to Lake (T-286). Pinder further testi-
fied that the loans toLake were repaid to Pinder out 
of the proceeds of the first sale of Lake's stock. The 
testimony of both parties indicated that 31,000 shares 
of Lake's stock in Standard Gilsonite Company had 
been sold in two transactions. The first such trans-
action occurred on April 11, 1958. On that date 
through Pinder's efforts 16,000 shares of stock were 
sold to McGee Enterprises of Hereford, Texas at 25c 
per share. Lake testified that he signed an authori-
zation for the company to transfer his shares (T-74). 
The authorization was introduced as Exhibit 22 and 
as follows: 
STATE OF TEX.1\S 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS~ 
"COUNTY OF DEAF SMITH 
'The undersigned, Jack E. Lake, does hereby trans-
fer and assign to Mcgee Enterprises, of Hereford, 
Txas, 16,000 shares of stck in STandard Gilsonite 
Co. and I do .hereby authorize R. J. Pender of any 
other person named by Taft Mcgee to issue and de-
liver said stock of said corporation to the SaidMc-
G·ee En terpris.es. The undersi-gned does hereby ac-
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knowledge the payment of $4,000.00 as the complete 
consideration for said stock and from this date on 
the ownership of said stock shall be in said purchas-
er regardless of the date of the issuance and deli v-
ery thereof. 
"In Testimony whereof witness my hand on this 
the 11th day of April, 1958. 
s/ Jack E. Lake 
"THE STATE OF TEXAS 
"COUNTY OF DEAF' SMITH 
"BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority on this 
day dersonally appeared Jack E. Lake, known to me 
to be the person whose name is subscribei to th~ 
foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same for the purposes and consider-
ation therein expressed. 
"GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF 
OFFICE this the 12th day of April, 1958. 
(Seal) 
sf James W. Witherspoon 
Notary Public in and 
for Deaf Smith County, 
Texas" 
Thereupon, Lake received a check for $4,000 
(T-74). He then gave Pinder the check for $4,000 a.nd 
Pinder gave Lake a check in return for $1,300 (T-76). 
The $1,300 check was introduced as Exhibit 24. 
Lake explained this transaction as follows: 
That he met Pinder in Houston and asked him 
about the money Pinder was to put into their joint 
venture; that Pinder, to raise some money, proposed 
to borrow some stock from Lake and sell the same 
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to McGee and Witherspoon agreeing to replace the 
borrowed stock with stock of his own; that thereup-
on Pinder took the proceeds of the sale and gave 
Lake $1,300 to cover Lake's expenses (T-73-76). 
Pinder explained the transaction as follows, de-
nying that any joint venture existed: 
That as soon as Lake delivered his 7,500 shares 
of L.H.&L. stock he began to talk of the possibility 
of selling his Standard Gilsonite stock because the 
Life Massage business was more important to Lake; 
that Pinder told him that the Standard Gilsonite stock 
was in escrow because it was investment stock and 
was very difficult to sell; that Lake asked if Pinder 
knew of anyone who would buy it on a long range 
investment basis; that some people in Texas agreed 
to buy 15,000 or 16,000 shares; that Pinder could not 
get to Texas immediately to complete the transac-
tion; that Lake would call Pinder 3 or 4 times a day 
about the stock; that Lake's financial condition was 
critical, and on one occasion he told Pinder that 
his car had been repossessed; that Pinder loaned 
Lake $2,500 because he knew he could obtain re-
payment as soon as the sale was completed; that 
to protect himself he put the legends on the backs 
of the checks sent to Lake; that as soon as the trans-
action was completed and the stock sold, Pinder 
took the $4,000 check from Lake and gave Lake his 
own check for $1,300 plus $200 cash, thus regain-
ing the $2500 which he had previously loaned Lake 
(T-285-287, 289, 291-299). 
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Pinder also denied that he had ever agreed 
to replace Lake's stock, and further testified tha.t 
Lake had never asked him to replace any stock (T-
295-296). 
The parties also testified that on April 17, 1958, 
another transaction occurred in which 15,000 shares 
of Lake's Standard Gilsonite stock were sold for 30c 
per share. Lake testified that Pinder told him he'd 
have to sign another stock power. He further testi-
fied that he didn't understand the transaction until 
Lake's brother who was present explained it to him 
and said it was "a fair deal." Lake thereupon wrote 
and signed in his own handwriting, the authoriza-
tion (T-81), which was introduced as Exhibit 21, and 
which stated as follows: 
"First National Bank 
of Hereford, Texas 
"Dear Sir, 
"April 17, 1958 
Houston, Texas 
"There is a check drawn on Mr. McGee and Mr. 
Whitherspoon account by a Mr. Pinder, in the 
amount of $5,000.00 which is in for collection now, 
it is in payment of 15,000 shares of Standard Gil-
sonite stock, this letter is to serve as a stock power 
for said 15,000 shares of stock. I am sending this 
letter as stock power at the request of Mr. Pinder. 
"Signature guaranteed 
"By R. J. Pinder 
Pres. Std. Gils·onite 
Sincerely, 
s/ Jack E. Lake 
Room 29 
Buffalo in Hotel 
9051 South Main St. 
Houston Texas" 
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This stock power then forwarded with a sight 
draft ~ade payable to Jack E. Lake, which was hon-
ored (T-199). The proceeds were deposited by Lake 
in a bank account on which the only signatory was 
Lake (T-178). Both partie_s agreed that Pinder re-
ceived none of the proceeds of the second sale (T-
82/1 197 -98). 
Lake, however, claimed these proceeds were 
to be part of Pinder's contribution to the "joint ven-
ture" and that Pinder agreed to replace this stock 
with his own shares. Pinder again denied that a 
joint venture ever existed or was contemplated, and 
denied that he ever agreed to act as trustee of Lake's 
stock or to replace any of Lake's stock with his own 
(T-305). 
With respect to the alleged joint venture, Lake 
testified that the business had not been successful 
because Pinder, who was supposed to contribute 
$12,000 to $13,000 only contributed the $9,000 de-
rived from the stock sales heretofore mentioned. 
On cross examination Lake aclmitted that his 
was the only signature on the bank account opened 
in the company name in Houston, Texas IT-178), that 
he had never formed a corporation (T-179), that he 
had never taken a lease on any premises in Texas 
(T-179), that he used the money for his personal 
needs, except that $2,600 had gone for 9quipment 
which was subsequently liquidated {T-179), in order 
for Lake to live (T-181), that he had never taken out 
a business license in Texas (T-199), and that he had 
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never filed any action for the damage he allegedly 
suffered in the Life Massage joint venture (T-201). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Judge, who 
sat without a jury, observed that there was a con-
flict in the testimony, and announced his decision 
as follows: 
"THE COURT: I will tell you gentlemen there are 
a few things here, as you both agree, there is a con-
flict between the witnesses as to what this was, but 
there are a few things that I think I can attach to 
as being some indication to the clue of this matter. 
There is one matter, Mr. Pinder's story that he is re-
paying these loans out if this $4,000.00, that all fits 
very well, but with the one exception I think these 
che·cks show that the writing on that one where the 
loan is secured by the stock is over the bank stamp. 
I think that is-
"MR. TUFT: Could we have that examined your 
honor? 
"THE COURT: Well, just let me finish. I think that 
is quite clear, that it appears to me that writing is 
on top, which refutes the idea that there was a loan; 
that that check was given for that. 
"Well now, we have an old rule of law and evidence 
that if a witness falsifies about one thing you can 
disbelieve his testimony on others. While Mr. Pin-
der's story of this loan - and it fits into the $4,-
000.00 - would be quite convincing if it were not 
for the fact that I think that that is not borne out 
and the contrary is borne out by the writing on that 
check. 
"MR. TUFT: Could we have it examined, Your 
Honor? 
"THE COURT: You can have it examined, but I 
am not going to continue the trial for that. 
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·'MR. McCULLOUGH: Can I point out one thing, 
if that contention be true, the endorsements are cer-
tainly not in the customary place. 
"THE COURT: Yes, that is right. But that is 
quite clear that that is above the stamp. You can see 
the print underneath it. 
"Now I think the best evidence here of what the 
value of this stock is what they sold it for and while 
there may be other sporadic sales for a dollar and 
later on some more I think the value that they 
agreed on at the time they sold this, whatever their 
arrangement was, is the best evidence of its value. 
That Mr. Pinder was to act as trustee of course the 
receipt shows that; so there must have been some 
trust. This $5,000.00 that was received went into a 
bank account for this Life Massage, if I understand 
the evidence, and there are checks and a bank ac-
count to show that. The 31,000 shares that are in dis-
pute and the 30c a share would be $9,300.00 is the 
amount that I believe the plaintiff is entitled to 
and, for the reasons that I have stated, that will be 
the judgment, in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant for the sum of $9,300.00 and court 
costs." 
Thereafter plaintiff presented Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and a judgment which were 
signed by the trial Judge on September 14, 1960. On 
September 21st defendant filed a motion to amend 
the Findings and Conclusions to conform to the 
Findings which the court announced from the 
bench. According to the terms of an affidavit of 
defendant's attorney, he also sought to present to 
the trial judge photostatic copies to demonstrate 
the condition of the two checks with respect to the 
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legends on the reverse side at the time they cleared 
the bank, which was rejected by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CON-
TRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE 
TRIAL. 
II 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS IN SUFFICIENT TO 
JUSTIFY THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG-
MENT. 
III 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AP-
PLIED THE MAXIM IIF ALSUS IN UNO/ F ALSUS IN 
OMNIBUS/' TO DISCREDIT DEFENDANT/S TESTI-
MONY. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONTRA-
RY TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the Findings 
of Fact signed by the trial court are contrary to the 
evidence adduced at the trial in the following par-
ticulars: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
a) The court erred in finding that defendant 
agreed with the plaintiff to deliver the L.H.&L. 
Mining Company "only upon the payment to 
the plaintiff of 37,500 shares of the capital stock 
of Standard Gilsonite Company." (T-16). 
The foregoing statement advanced by plaintiffs 
counsel and adopted by the trial court does not 
even conform to the testimony of the plaintiff him-
sel£. 
At page T-62 the plaintiff testified: 
" ... but the balance he (Pinder) would act as 
trustee and he would not deliver my L.H.&L. stock 
until he made sure they would issue the 37,500 
shares ... ,, (Emphasis added). 
We submit there is a substantial difference in 
these two versions, inasmuch as the 37,500 shares 
were finally issued by Standard Gilsonite Company 
and it was never proved at the trial that defendant 
did deliver the L.H.&L. stock prior to such a time as 
he "made sure they would issue the 37,500 shares." 
b) That the trial court erred in finding as a fact 
"that the defendant breached his trust agree-
ment and delivered the plaintiff's L.H.&L. stock 
to Standard Gilsonite Company immediately up-
on his return to Salt Lake City from Denver, Col-
orado." (T-16). 
In the first place the statement "that the defend-
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ant breached his trust agreement" is properly a con-
clusion of law and not a finding of fact. In the sec-
ond place, as noted above under subdivision a), 
even plaintiff's own testimony did not prove any 
breach of agreement on the part of defendant in 
delivering the L. H. & L. stock to Standard Gilsonite 
Company immediately upon his return to Salt Lake 
City, since the evidence did not show that at that 
time there was anything which would lead defend-
ant to believe that Standard Gilsonite would not is-
sue the 37,500 shares agreed upon to plaintiff. It 
is true that there was considerable delay on the 
part of the company in issuing the stock. The com-
pany secretary, whose duty it was to complete the 
transfer testified that the company experienced dif-
ficulty in accomplishing the transfer of the L.H.&L. 
stock (T-268). However, the record clearly shows that 
as soon as all requirements for the transfer were 
completed (see Exhibit 19, and also T-268-272)/ 37~-
500 shares of stock were finally issued to plaintiff 
on January 19, 1959 (T-157). 
c) That the court erred in finding that '/the de-
fendant, Robert J. Pinder, agreed with the plain-
tiff that he would advance to the venture $15,-
000 to provide capital for the organizational ex-
penses, including the living expenses and ex-
penses already incurred by the plaintiff, Jack 
E. Lake, while in training with the Life Massage 
and Home Equipment Company in Denver/ Col-
orado. " (T-17). 
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According to the testimony of Lake, Pinder was 
to advance $12,000 to $13,000 (T-67, 127, 200; 201; 
222). Furthermore, the record is totally devoid of 
any evidence which would indicate that the expens-
es already incurred by Lake in Denver were to be 
borne by Pinder, or were to come out of any funds 
advanced by Pinder. 
d) That the court erred in finding that "Pursu-
ant to this agreement the defendant advanced 
the sum of $2,000.00." (T-17). 
It is an elementary rule of law that a wit-
ness's testimony is no stronger than upon cross-ex-
amination. On cross-examination the plaintiff admitt-
ed that the $2,000.00 advanced by Pinder were per-
sonal loans to the plaintiff (T-169, 170). 
e) That the court erred in finding that "the 
defendant did not intend to deliver the stock to 
the plaintiff as agreed, but intended to defraud 
him of his stock." (T-19) 
Any possible fraud on the part of the defendant 
was neither pleaded nor proved in this action. The 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that the acts 
constituting any alleged fraud be set forth with spec-
ificity in the complaint. The only allegations of plain-
tiff's amended complaint with respect to the 31,000 
shares of stock which defendant allegedly agreed 
to replace were "but that the defendant, Robert J. 
Pinder, has failed and refused to deliver the 31,000 
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shares of stock to which the plaintiff is entitled.~~ (T-
9, 10) 
At the trial the defendant denied that he had 
ever agreed to replace any stock for Lake, and con-
tended that the sales were for Lake's benefit and 
Lake received the proceeds thereof, less the 
amounts which Pinder had previously loaned to 
Lake. 
It is respectfully submitted that the allegations 
of the amended complaint do not raise any issue 
of fraud, and that there is no evidence in the record 
to justify the court's finding in this respect. 
f) That the court erred in finding that ''the 
defendant did not cause the 37,500 shares of 
stock due the plaintiff to even be issued until 
May of 1959. That he thereafter caused the stock 
to be transferred to persons other than the plain-
tiff. II (T-20). 
The uncontroverted evidence shows that the 
stock was issued January 19, 1959 (T-157). Further 
evidence, which is also uncontroverted, shows that 
the defendant was not the active offi~er in arranged 
for the transfer of the stock of Standard Gilsonite 
Company, but that such was the duty of the comp-
any secretary, Robert M. Williamson, who actually 
performed the duty and received the shares from 
the transfer agent (T-268, 269). 
Stipulations of plaintiff's counsel at the trial, 
and the testimony of Gale Holt, comptroller of Stand-
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ard Gilsonite Company, who was produced as a 
witness on behalf of the plaintifL indicate that 6500 
shares of stock were delivered to plaintifL and were 
traded by him on the open market (T-165, 166). The 
remaining 31,000 shares were covered by the two 
stock transfers previously executed by plaintiff per-
sonally. On March 4, 1960, a 15,000 share certificate 
issued in the name of Jack E. Lake was transferred 
to Taft McGee (T-162). On AprilS, 1959, a 16,000 
share certificate issued to Jack E. Lake was transferr-
ed to a Harold Dunn (T-158). The evidence indicated 
that a stock power covering these shares had been 
executed by plaintiff in favor of McGee Enterprises 
(See Exhibit 21). 
While Mr. Dunn's connection with McGee En-
terprises is not shown by the testimony, it is respect-
fully submitted that when the plaintiff executed the 
stock power he knowingly gave up his right to have 
those 16,000 shares issued and delivered to him by 
the company. 
II 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
JUSTIFY THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG-
MENT. 
The defendant respectfully contends that con-
clusion No. 2 "That the defendant is liable -to the 
plaintiff for the reasonable value of the 31,000 shares 
of stock which has never been delivered to the plain-
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tiff . . . II is not supported by the Findings o£ Fact 
or the evidence. 
This case was tried on the theory that defendant, 
while acting as a trustee for plaintiff of 37,500 shares 
of Standard Gilsonite stock, converted 31,000 shares 
from plaintiff. (See T-8-10, 28, 92 160-161.) We submit 
that the Findings of Fact and plaintiff's testimony it-
self do not support the proposition that defendant 
was ever a trustee of plaintiff's Standard Gilsonite 
stock or the proposition that defendant converted 
any of the said stock. For convenience and clarity 
the foregoing matters will be treated separately. 
a) As to whether defendant was a trustee for 
plaintiff of Standard Gilsonite stock. 
Plaintiff's testimony with respect to the alleged 
trust of Standard Gilsonite stock, except for one var-
iance, is well summarized in Finding of Fact Nos. 2 
and 3, the important details of which are as follows: 
a) On February 11, 1958, the Board of Direc-
tors of Standard Gilsonite Company approved 
the sale of 37,500 shares of stock to plaintiff in 
exchange for 7,500 shares of stock in L. H. & L. 
Mining Co. owned by plaintiff. 
b) On March 15, 1958, plaintiff delivered his 
stock in the L. H. & L. Mining Co. to defendant 
in Denver, II and the defendant agreed with the 
plaintiff to take the said stock as trustee and to 
deliver the same to Standard Gilsonite Com-
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pany ... " (Emphasis added) 
c) "The defendant requested that the plaintiff 
permit the defendant to receive the plaintiff's 
stock to be issued in Standard Gilsonite Com-
pany as trustee for the plaintiff. ... " (Emphasis 
added) 
d) That defendant represented to plaintiff that 
because of his knowledge of the market for said 
stock that he could arrange sales for the plaintiff 
at ''the best possible price.'' 
e) "That the defendant did not take into his 
possession and custody the 37,500 shares of 
stock as he had agreed to do ... '' 
Even viewing the foregoing in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, these findings will not support 
a conclusion that defendant ever acted as a trustee 
of plaintiff's 37,500 shares of Standard Gilsonite stock. 
According to the Restatement of Trusts, Vol. l, 
sec. 75: 
"An interest which has not come into existence ... 
cannot be held in trust." 
The comments on this section make the matter 
even clearer. 
"a) An interest may not be in existence be-
cause the thing which would be the subject mat-
ter of the interest is not in existence, or because 
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although the thing is not in existence no one 
has an interest in it ... A person can, it is true, 
make a contract binding himself to create a trust 
of an interest if he should thereafter acquire it; 
but such an agreement is not binding as a con-
tract unless the requirements of the law of con-
tracts are complied with. (See comment b). 
"Thus, if a person gratuitously declares 
himself trustee of such shares as he may there-
after acquire in a corporation not yet organized, 
no trust is created. The result is the same where 
instead of declaring himself trustee, he purports 
to transfer to another as trustee such shares as 
he may thereafter acquire in a corporation not 
yet organized. In such a case there is at most a 
gratuitous undertaking to create a trust in the 
future, and such an undertaking is not binding 
as a contract for lack of consideration (see cor.n-
ment b). So also, if a person declares himself 
trustee of the next picture he will paint or the 
next calf his cow will conceive and bear, no 
trust is created. 
'b) Liability on contract. If a person purports 
to declare himself trustee o£ an interest not in 
existence, or if he purports to transfer such an 
interest to another in trust, he is liable as upon 
a contract to create a trust if, but only if, the re-
quirements of the law of contracts are complied 
with (See sec. 30). 
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"c) Where settlor subsequently acquires an 
interest. If a person purports to declare himself 
trustee of an interest not in existence or if he pur-
ports to transfer such an interest to another in 
trust, no trust arises even when the interest 
comes into existence in the absence of a mani-
festation of intention at that time (See sec. 26-
intention to create a present trust)." 
From the foregoing it should be clear that at 
the time of the meeting in Denver on March 15, 1958, 
no trust of Standard Gilsonite stock was created, in-
asmuch as plaintiff owned no stock in Standard Gil-
sonite Company at that time. The most that such a 
transaction could amount to is promise by defendant 
to create a trust in the future for the benefit of plain-
tiff. However, the Findings indicate that no consid-
eration was given defendant for such promise, which 
was therefore gratuitous and unenforceable, even 
though plaintiff subsequently acquired an interest 
in the stock. 
Furthermore, the Findings disclose that de-
fendant never took possession o£ plaintiff's shares 
(T-16). The uncontroverted testimony at the trial in-
dicated that the shares were never issued by Stand-
ard Gilsonite Company until January 19, 1959. Inas-
much as this action was commenced June 16, 1958, 
it is not likely, and it was not alleged, that there was 
any manifestation of an intention by defendant to 
hold any shares in trust for plaintiff after January 19, 
1959. 
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The only trust shown by the evidence to have 
existed was with respect to plaintiff's shares of L. H. 
& L. Mining Company for the purpose o£ delivering 
the same to Standard Gilsonite Company. It is un-
controverted that the shares were so delivered. 
Furthermore, no damages were pleaded or proved 
with respect to any alleged breach of this trust. 
b) As to whether defendant converted plain-
tiff's stock in Standard Gilsonite Companny. 
The alleged conversion of plaintiff's Standard 
Gilsonite stock arose out of two sales of plaintiff's 
stock to a Mr. Weatherspoon and his associates. 
On April 11, 1958, plaintiff executed Exhibit 22 
which purported to transfer 16,000 shares to McGee 
Enterprises of Hereford, Texas on a "when issued" 
basis. On April 17, 1958, plaintiff executed ExhiJ:it 
21, which plaintiff described as a stock power, to 
transfer 15,000 shares of stock to McGee and Wither-
spoon. 
Plaintiff testified that each of the sales were ac-
tually made for the benefit of the defendant, and that 
defendant agreed to replace the stock so transferred 
with stock of his own. 
There are at least four reasons why these trans-
actions do not amount to conversion by the defend-
ant. 
1) There can be no conversion of property not 
yet in existence. 
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In Bertleson v. Van Deusen Bros. Co., 37 Idaho 
199, 217 Pac. 983, the evidence disclosed that a man 
and wife named Berry had agreed to sell plaintiff 
the 1917 hay crop to be grown on their land at $8.00 
per ton. Plaintiff had tendered part payment. After 
the crop was grown and stacked the Berry's repudi-
ated the contract, whereupon plaintiff measured the 
crop and tendered the balance, which the Berry's 
refused. Thereafter, they sold the crop to the de-
fendant, who had no notice of plaintiff's prior deal-
ing with the Berry's. Plaintiff brought suit against 
defendant in claim and delivery. At the trial judg-
ment was awarded plaintiff against defendant, who 
appealed. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed, holding 
that the contract between plaintiff and the Berrys 
was executory at the time it was made, and that no 
title passed to plaintiff, without which they could not 
maintain an action for claim and delivery. The Court 
also indicated that the same result would obtain on 
a suit for conversion, and stated that the plaintiffs 
only remedy was to sue the Berrys for the breach 
of their contract to deliver the )'lay. ~ 
--!..·;.:),.~ 
In the present case the evidence does not sn61n 
the date at which p_laintiff became entitled-toreceive 
37,500 shares of stock_ from the Stan_d-ard Gi1sonile 
Company. The evidence merely shows that on 
March 15, 1958, plaintiff gave his L. H. & L. stoc-k to 
defendant for _delivery ~o. the Standard _Gilsonite 
Company (T-117); that it was deli~ered to->th-e com-
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pany sometime later; and that some delay and diffi-
culty was experienced getting the L. H. & L. stock 
transferred into the name of Standard Gilsonite Com-
pany. 
The uncontroverted testimony of the comptrol-
ler of Standard Gilsonite Company indicates that 
plaintiff's stock was not issued until January 19, 1959, 
which was long after the dates of all the transactions 
in question (T-157). 
2) In order to pr~ve a co·nversion of his stock, 
plaintiff must show that he had the right to posses-
sion of the stock at the time of the alleged conver-
sion. 
In Christensen v. Pugh, 84 Utah 440, 36 P.2d 
100, the Supreme Court of Utah sustained a demurrer 
to plaintiff's complaint, where the complaint showed 
that plaintiff's stock with plaintiff's consent was sub-
jected to a bailment which had never been termin-
ated. See also 53 Am. Jur .. Trover and Conversion, 
sec. 68 and cases cited therein. 
The physical evidence adduced by plaintiff 
demonstrates that plaintiff's stock was to be escrowed 
(See Exhibit l, T-355). Mr. Williamson, who arranged 
the exchange of stock with plaintiff testified that he 
(acting for Standard Gilsonite Company) and Lake 
had agreed to escrow the plaintiff's stock with Wil-
liamson for one year (T-261). 
Lake himself admitted that an escrow was con-
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templated (T-111) but stated that the escrow holder 
was to be his attorney or bank (T-112, 172). 
Furthermore, as pointed out in the preceding 
subdivision, the evidence in this case does not show 
that plaintiff was entitled to have the stock issued 
to him by Standard Gilsonite Company at any time 
prior to January 19, 1959. 
3) No action for conversion can be maintained 
where the plaintiff consents to the specific acts of de-
fendant of which he complains. 
Thus, in Christensen v. Pugh, supra, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
"In this action plaintiff pleads that he delivered or 
caused to be delivered, to defendant Pugh the prop-
erty in question, to be used by Pugh as collateral 
in Pugh's deal and business, for Pugh's benefit, and 
not for plaintiff's use, business or benefit. The trans· 
fer of possession was a willful and voluntary act 
of the plaintiff, and he cannot now assert that Pugh 
obtained possession in defiance of his title or his 
right of possession, and so maintain an action in 
conversion simply because Pugh may have had ul-
terior motives. It follows, therefore, that plaintiff's 
first ground of conversion fails." 
In the present case the uncontroverted evidence 
discloses that plaintiff knew of the two sales of his 
stock and that he not only consented to such sales, 
but that he voluntarily executed the documents nec-
esary to complete the sales. In fact the second sale 
was completed after plaintiff, who claimed he did 
not understand the transaction, had consulted with 
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his brother, and after plaintiff was advised by his 
brother that it seemed to be "a fair deal". (T-80-81) 
4) Acceptance by the plaintiff o·f the proceeds 
of the sale of the property alleged to have been con-
verted operates as a ratification or waiver of the 
alleged acts of conversion. 
In the case of Dimock v. United States National 
Bank, 55 N.J.L. 296, 25 Atl. 926, Dimock and others 
had given the United States National Bank (herein-
after referred to as the bank) a note for $50,000, which 
was secured by corporate stock. The note author-
ized the bank to sell the stock before maturity if l) 
the market value of the stock depreciated below the 
loan balance, and 2) the promisors failed to pay the 
difference between the loan balance and the lower 
value of the stock after notice to do so. Prior to ma-
turity of the note many. banks failed, and the prom-
isors were forced to make an assignment for the 
benefit of their creditors. At that time the market 
value of the stock had fallen below the loan balance. 
Instead of calling upon the promisors to pay the dif-
ference, the bank sent a notice to the promisors de-
manding payment of the note in full. Thereafter, but 
still before maturity of the note, the bank sold the 
stock and applied the proceeds to the loan balance. 
Several years later, this suit was brought by the bank 
to recover the deficiency. 
The defendants alleged that the bank had con-
verted their stock by its unauthorized sale of the 
stock, and sought to recover the highest value the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
stock had attained between the date of the conver-
sion and the time of the trial. 
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New I ersey 
held that the bank had converted. the stock by its un-
authorized sale; that the correct measure of dam-
ages was the so-called "New York Rule," which the 
court stated to be the majority rule, and which would 
allow as damages the highest intermediate value of 
the stock between the time of the conversion and a 
reasonable time after the owner received notice of 
it. 
However, the court also found that the promisors 
had notice of the sale immediately after the sale, and 
had never objected to the sale; and that on two occa-
sians the promisors had set forth a list of their cred-
itors which contained the name of the bank and 
showed as a balance due ·the bank approximately 
the difference between the loan balance and the 
proceeds of the sale. The court then said: 
"The defendants had the election either to ratify the 
sale, and claim the benefit of it, or repudiate it, and 
hold the plaintiff in damages. The act of the de-
fendants in applying the proceeds of the sale as a 
credit on the plaintiff's note is so positive and em-
phatic an act of ratification and adoption that it 
cannot be retracted." 
The judgment was thereupon affirmed. 
In the case now before the court the evidence 
and the Findings of Fact indicate that the plaintiff 
received the proceeds of the sales of the stock for 
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which recovery is now sought, except for $2,500, 
most of which plaintiff admitted he had received 
from defendant as loans. (T-170) 
Defendant respectfully submits that any one of 
the foregoing factors would preclude the court from 
finding that defendant had converted plaintiff's 
stock. It should also be remembered that the court 
found as a fact that defendant never took possession 
or custody of plaintiff's 37,500 shares of stock. Ac-
cordingly, it would be legally impossible for the 
defendant to act as a trustee of plaintiffs' stock, or to 
convert the same. 
According to the case of Christensen vs. Pugh, 
supra, the most frequently quoted definition of con-
version is: 
"Conversion consists either in the appropriation of 
a thing to the party's own use and beneficial enjoy-
ment, or in its destruction, or in exercising domin-
ion over it, in exclusion or defiance of the owner's 
right, or in withholding the possession of the prop-
erty from the owner under a claim of title incon-
~.istent with his own." 
In view of the fact that defendant never took 
possession or custody of the stock, and that the plain-
tiff knew of the sales, consented· to :them, and~ re-
ceived the proceeds thereof, it cannot('be satd·.that 
defendant did any of the acts contain-ed· in ihe above 
-definition necessary to prove a .conversion.· ~. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
III 
THE TRIAL COURT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRI-
CIOUSLY APPLIED THE MAXIM "FALSUS IN UNOI 
F ALSUS IN OMNIBUS" TO DISCREDIT DEFEND-
ANT'S TESTIMONY. 
During the course of the trial, the plaintiff testi-
fied that defendant, on three occasions, had ad-
anced him funds totalling $2,500. The plaintiff ex-
plained these, and the court found as a fact that they 
were part of a larger amount ($15,000) which de-
fendant was to advance plaintiff as organizational 
expenses, including living expenses of plaintiff in 
connection with the joint venture in the Life Massage 
business. Defendant, on the other hand, contended 
that these were merely loans to plaintiff which were 
ultimately repaid out of the proceeds of the first 
stock sale, plaintiff receiving the balance of the 
proceeds. 
On the backs of Exhibit 25 and 26 (two checks 
in the amount of $1,000 each) were legends indicat-
ing these were loans. At the trial plaintiff testified 
that he could not say whether· the legends were 
there when he cashed the checks (T-171). Defen-
dant insisted they were there when the checks were 
deposited (T-286). At the conclusion of the case the 
trial court stated that it appeared to him that he 
legends were written over the bank's cancellation 
stamps~ and thusl would not support defendanfs 
story of the loans, which was quite convincing other-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
wise. The court then applied the maxim that where 
"a witness falsifies about one thing you can disbe-
lieve his testimony on others.'' (T-332) 
At the time defendant's counsel moved to 
amend the Findings of Fact he attempted to present 
to the court photostats of the exhibits obtained from 
the bank showing that the legends were on the 
checks at the time they cleared the bank. However, 
the court rejected the offer (T-30), and also refused 
to adopt the defendant's proposed findings which 
included the court's actual findings with respect to 
why it chose to disbelieve defendant's testimony 
(See T -23-26). 
In 4 Jones on Exedince sec. 2471 (2d Ed.) we find 
the reason for the adoption of the maxim ''falsus in 
uno, falsus in omnibus.'' After stating that the maxim 
originally applied to one who had been convicted 
of perjury, the author states, quoting Judge Story: 
"Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which 
he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in re-
lation to the country of his birth, or his being in a 
vessel on a particular voyage, or living in a partie·· 
ular place, iF lhe fact turn ou;t otherwise, it is ex-
tremely difficult to exempt him from the charge 
of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice; under 
such circumstances, are bound upon pri11ciples of 
law and morality and justice to apply the maxim 
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. , What .ground of 
judicial belief can there be left when·:the party has 
shown such gross insensibility to the difference be-
tween right and wrong, betwee11:. truth and false-
hood?" (Quoting from The Santissima Trinidad, 7 
Wheat. (U. S.) 283, 5 L. ed. 454.) ~(ltmphasis added) 
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Jones further states, among others, the follow:-
ing limitations on the application of the maxim.: _ 
l) The testimony concerning whic~ th~ wit-
:_ness has sworn falsely must relate to a material ... 
point in issue. 
· 2) Such testimony must have been giv~n b;;:o 
the witness intentionally, and he must have 
known it to be false. {4 Jones on Evidence sec. 
2472, 2d Ed.) 
We respectfully submit that both limitations mili-
tate against the application of the maxim in this case. 
Defendant's testimony that the legends were in place 
on the checks when given to plaintiff was not con-
troverted by plaintiff. Consequently, this point was 
never in issue. In the second place, an examination 
of the photostats supplied by defendant's bank 
shows defendant's testimony to have been true, 
rather than false (See T-30). 
We respectfully submit that this adds new mean-
ing to the statement of the trial judge, "while Mr. 
Pinder's story of this loan--+and it fits into the $4,-
000.00-would be quite convincing if it were not 
for the fact that I think thQ.t it is not borne out and the 
contrary is borne out by the writing on that check." 
(T-332) Thus, in his findings from the bench the trial 
judge announced, in effect, that he would believe 
Pinder's testimony except that the writing on the 
checks ap:peareg to b.e added . after the _checks had 
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cleared the bank. In view of this statement, and in 
view of the fact that all the physical evidence intro-
duced corroborates Pinder's version of the "loans" 
and the alleged joint venture, we submit that the 
weight of the evidence clearly indicates that there 
was no joint venture in the Life Massage business, 
and that it was error for the court to find otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that the Find-
ings of Fact are not supported by the ev]dence and 
are contrary to the evidence in the particulars here-
inabove set forth; that the court improperly dis-
credited defendant's testimony; and that in any 
event the evidence at the trial will not justify the 
Conclusions of Law and the judgment entered 
against the defendant on any theory. 
WHEREFORE, we respectfully request that this 
Honorable Court reverse the judgment heretofore 
entered by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN G. MARSHALL 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant Robert J. Pinder 
53 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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